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Body ownership refers to the special perceptual status of one’s own
body, which makes bodily sensations seem unique to oneself. We
studied the neural correlates of body ownership by controlling whether
an external object was accepted as part of the body or not. In the
rubber hand illusion (RHI), correlated visuotactile stimulation causes
a fake hand to be perceived as part of one’s own body. In the present
study, we distinguished between the causes (i.e., multisensory
stimulation) and the effect (i.e., the feeling of ownership) of the RHI.
Participants watched a right or a left rubber hand being touched either
synchronously or asynchronously with respect to their own unseen
right hand. A quantifiable correlate of the RHI is a shift in the perceived
position of the subject’s hand toward the rubber hand. We used
positron emission tomography to identify brain areas whose activity
correlated with this proprioceptive measure of body ownership. Body
ownership was related to activity in the right posterior insula and the
right frontal operculum. Conversely, when the rubber hand was not
attributed to the self, activity was observed in the contralateral
parietal cortex, particularly the somatosensory cortex. These struc-
tures form a network that plays a fundamental role in linking current
sensory stimuli to one’s own body and thus also in self-consciousness.
Keywords: agency, body ownership, insula, rubber hand illusion,
self-consciousness, somatosensory cortex
Introduction
When I decide to write, I do not need to look for my hand in the
same way that I have to look for a pen or a piece of paper, for the
simple reason that my hand is ‘‘always there’’ (James 1890),
present with me. This example illustrates the immediacy of
experiences of one’s own body. The feeling that ‘‘my body’’
belongs to me, and is ever present in my mental life, is called
body ownership (Gallagher 2000). The sense of body ownership
gives somatosensory signals a special phenomenal quality, and it
is fundamental to self-consciousness: the relation between my
body and ‘‘me’’ differs from both the relation between my body
and other people’s bodies and the relation between ‘‘me’’ and
external objects. However, the scientiﬁc study of body owner-
ship raises important methodological problems.
It is difﬁcult to study experimentally the neural and functional
signatures of bodyownership, simply because the body is ‘‘always
there’’ (James 1890). Classical experimental designs cannot
isolate the sense of body ownership by direct manipulations
that make the body present in one experimental condition but
absent in another. Moreover, body ownership may be easily
confounded with the sense of controlling one’s body because
agency is a powerful cue to ownership: my body feels like ‘‘mine’’
because I can control it at will. For example, recent neuro-
imaging studies on self-attribution of voluntary actions report
activations in the insular lobe when subjects attribute an
observed action to themselves (Farrer and Frith 2002; Farrer
et al. 2003). However, it is not clear whether this activity reﬂects
a sense of agency due to thematch betweenmotor intention and
sensory feedback or whether it reﬂects body ownership due to
intersensory match between proprioceptive and visual stimuli.
Intersensory matching may be sufﬁcient for body ownership,
even in the absence of agency, because somatosensory signals
clearly relate to the self even in the absence of voluntary
movement (Tsakiris et al. 2005, 2006). In the present study, we
used an experimental paradigm that allowed themanipulation of
body ownership alone to investigate the neural causes and
effects of sensory-driven body ownership. Body ownership may
arise from unimodal sensory input (e.g., touch, see Ehrsson,
Holmes, and Passingham 2005). However, the unique experi-
ence of seeing and at the same time feeling one’s own hand relies
on interactions between different sensory modalities (e.g.,
touch, proprioception, and vision) andmay contribute to a better
understanding of the body-related sensory processing.
The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is an experimental paradigm
that isolates the pure sense of body ownership in the absence of
movement and efferent information. Brieﬂy, watching a rubber
hand being stroked synchronously with one’s own unseen hand
causes the rubber hand to be attributed to one’s ownbody, to ‘‘feel
like it’s my hand’’ (Botvinick and Cohen 1998). This illusion does
not occur when the rubber hand is stroked asynchronously with
respect to the participant’s own hand. Thus, the RHI allows an
external object to be treated as part of the body, or not, under
experimental control. For that reason, it offers a useful experi-
mentalmanipulation of body ownership. One behavioral correlate
of the RHI is an induced change in the perceived location of the
participant’s own hand toward the rubber hand. Botvinick and
Cohen (1998) showed that the prevalence of illusion over time is
positively correlatedwith a drift in the felt locationof the subject’s
own hand toward the rubber hand. In Tsakiris and Haggard
(2005b), participants perceived their hand to be signiﬁcantly
closer to the rubber hand after synchronous visuotactile stimu-
lation than after asynchronous visuotactile stimulation, suggesting
integration between the visually perceived rubber hand and the
tactile experience on the participant’s own hand.
How does the rubber hand come to be experienced as part of
one’s own body? First, integration of correlated synchronous
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visual and tactile stimulation is a necessary condition for the RHI
to occur (Botvinick and Cohen 1998; Ehrsson et al. 2004;
Tsakiris and Haggard 2005b). In addition, the inducement of the
illusion entails the assimilation of correlated visuotactile per-
cepts in a preexisting reference of one’s own body. When, for
example, participants were stimulated on their left hand, while
they were looking at a right rubber hand being touched
synchronously with their own hand, they did not experience
the RHI (see Experiment 2 in Tsakiris and Haggard 2005b).
Thus, correlation of visual and tactile percepts is necessary but
perhaps not sufﬁcient to elicit a sense of body ownership.
Ownership requires the viewed object to ﬁt with a general
preexisting representation of the body scheme, suggesting that
body ownership is also modulated by top--down inﬂuences
based on prior visual, proprioceptive, and functional represen-
tations of the body.
These observations suggest that the primary sensory events
that ‘‘cause’’ the rubber hand to be attributed to one’s own body
(e.g., multisensory correlation) may be different from the
phenomenal ‘‘effects’’ of ownership. Put another way, seeing
the rubber hand and feeling tactile stimulation may cause the
rubber hand to ‘‘feel like it is mine.’’ This feeling is clearly
distinct from the tactile and visual sensations themselves.
Integrating synchronized visual and tactile percepts, then, is
a necessary condition for producing the RHI. The result of this
process is a persistent, vivid phenomenological change in body
representation, namely, the experience that the rubber hand is
part of one’s own body. The content of the changed body
representation might be quite different from, and goes beyond,
the perception of correlated visual and tactile stimulation.
In the present study, we investigated the neural basis of the
sense of body ownership by separately analyzing the ‘‘causes’’
and also the ‘‘effects’’ of the RHI. Participants were always stim-
ulated on their unseen right hand, while they viewed a right or
a left rubber hand being stimulated either synchronously or
asynchronously with respect to their own hand. Across all con-
ditions, participants judged the felt position of their own hand
before and after visuotactile stimulation. The proprioceptive
judgment was used as a behavioral measure of body ownership
during the RHI. We used PET to detect sustained neural activity
that was speciﬁcally related to the stable state of ownership of
the rubber hand and not the onset of the RHI per se.
The experimental design allowed us to use the ‘‘interactions’’
between the bottom--up (i.e., synchronous vs. asynchronous
visuotactile stimulation) and top--down (i.e., congruent vs.
incongruent rubber hand identity) factors to investigate the
causes of the RHI, that is, the sensory conditions that induce
alterations in ownership. In an additional analysis, we correlated
neural activity with the strength of the RHI as measured by the
‘‘proprioceptive drift’’ in the felt position of the participant’s
hand. This analysis would identify the neural correlates of
the phenomenal ‘‘effect’’ of the RHI, namely, the feeling that
the rubber hand is part of one’s own body or, alternatively, the
feeling that the rubber hand is not one’s own hand.
Overall, the alterations in body ownership during the RHI
involve several processes such as the monitoring of body-
related sensory signals, the integration of these signals when
there is no conﬂict, and ﬁnally the update of a body-related self-
representation. We wanted to distinguish between causes and
effects of the RHI for the reasons given above. As regards the
factors causing the RHI, we hypothesized that areas associated
with the integration of multisensory signals, such the premotor
and parietal cortices (see Ehrsson et al. 2004), will be active
when visual and tactile events are congruent. In the case of
a conﬂict between visual and tactile events, we hypothesized
that frontal areas would be activated, especially in the right
hemisphere (see Fink et al. 1999). We also made speciﬁc
hypotheses about the neural correlates of the phenomenal
effects of the RHI. We predicted that the subjective experience
of body ownership would activate the brain’s self-processing
network. In particular, we predicted that the right posterior
insula, an area linked to self-representations of sensorimotor
events (Farrer et al. 2003), representations of egocentric
reference frame and ﬁrst-person perspective (Fink et al. 2003;
Vogeley et al. 2004), would be correlated with the strength of
ownership over the rubber hand.
Materials and Methods
Experimental Design
The experimental design was 2 3 2 factorial (see Fig. 1). The ﬁrst factor
was the identity of the rubber hand that was either congruent to the
participant’s stimulated hand or incongruent. Participants were always
stimulated on their right hand, while looking at a right or a left rubber
hand. The second factor was the mode of visuotactile stimulation.
Participants saw the rubber hand being touched either synchronously
with the touch delivered on their own hand or asynchronously. The
experiment consisted of 4 blocked conditions, and each condition was
repeated 3 times, resulting in 12 trials. Each participant performed the
blocks in a different pseudorandom order.
Experimental Setup and Methods
The methods were based on a previous behavioral study (see Experi-
ment 4 in Tsakiris and Haggard 2005b), with modiﬁcations appropriate
for the PET scanning environment (see Fig. 2). Participants rested in
a supine position on the bed in the PET scanner. Their right arm was
extended and placed on a tilted support (~75) inside a frame. Their
right hand was placed by the experimenter at a ﬁxed point inside the
frame, whose topside was covered by a black screen. Participants did not
have vision of their hand. The rubber hand was placed on the same
frame and was presented in front of the participants, aligned with their
midline and on the same plane as their hidden hand. A pair of life-size
rubber prosthetic hands (Otto Bock HealthCare, Duderstadt, Germany)
was used. The distance between the rubber hand and the participant’s
hand was 15 cm.
At the beginning of each trial, both the participant’s right hand and
the rubber hand were out of sight. A pretest baseline estimate of ﬁnger
position was obtained prior to stimulation. A ruler was presented on
a horizontal surface, 18 cm above the hands and aligned with the
participant’s frontoparallel plane. Participants were asked ‘‘Where is
Figure 1. The 2 3 2 factorial experimental design.
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your middle ﬁnger?’’ and verbally reported a number on the ruler in
response. They were instructed to judge the position of their ﬁnger by
projecting a parasagittal line from the center of their ﬁngertip to the
ruler. The judgment was recorded, and no feedback was given.
After the judgment, the ruler and the black screen covering the
rubber hand were removed to make the rubber hand appear, and tactile
stimulation of the hands begun. Stimulation was delivered mechanically
by a custom-built stroking machine, consisting of 2 computer-con-
trolled stepper motors at the end of which we attached 2 identical
paintbrushes. Participants were always stimulated on the middle ﬁnger
of their right hand. A left (i.e., incongruent) or a right (i.e., congruent)
rubber hand was also stimulated on the middle ﬁnger. We stimulated the
middle ﬁnger because the relative position of the middle ﬁnger is the
same for both left and right hands. Stimulation was delivered along
the ﬁnger, from the knuckle to the ﬁngertip or vice versa. To simulate
the unpredictable nature of manual stroking, the direction and speed
of stroking were randomly varied within condition. The participant’s
hand and the rubber hand always received the same random direction
and speed on each stroke. In the synchronous conditions, both
hands were stroked simultaneously. In the asynchronous conditions,
the participant’s hand was stroked with a random delay of 500--1000 ms
after the stimulation of the rubber hand. The total amount and spatial
pattern of stimulation were the same across all conditions. Synchro-
nous and asynchronous conditions differed only in the degree of
temporal correlation of visual and tactile stimulation. Stimulation lasted
for 125 s.
After the stimulation period, the rubber hand was covered with
a black screen, and the ruler was presented in front of the participants.
The ruler was always presented with a random offset to ensure that
participants judged ﬁnger position anew on each trial and that they
could not simply repeat previous responses. They were asked to make
one more judgment regarding the felt position of their right middle
ﬁnger. After their response, the ruler was removed, and the participants
were asked to move their right hand and have a rest. Following the rest
period (7 min), their right hand was again passively placed inside the
frame and out of sight. The same procedure was followed for each
condition.
In each block, injection of 500 MBq [15O] water occurred 45 s after
the onset of visuotactile stimulation. PET data acquisition started 15 s
after the injection to allow the contrast agent to reach the brain and
lasted for 60 s, allowing another 5 s of visuotactile stimulation to ensure
that stimulation did not stop before the completion of the scanning (see
Fig. 2, and also PET Hardware and Procedures).
At the end of the experiment, participants completed a questionnaire
based on a previous questionnaire devised by Botvinick and Cohen
(1998). Subjects used a Likert scale (from –3 to 3) to rate 18 statements.
Participants were asked to indicate their response on a 7-step visual
analogue scale ranging from ‘‘agree strongly’’ (+++) to ‘‘disagree strongly’’
(–––). The questions focused on comparing the sense of ownership for
each rubber hand identity condition, but only for the conditions where
the stimulation between the participant’s hand and the rubber hand was
synchronous (i.e., conditions CS and IS). Thus, the questionnaire
included 18 questions. Half of these 18 questions referred to the
synchronous congruent conditions (i.e., right rubber hand, condition
CS), and the other half referred to the synchronous incongruent
conditions (i.e., left rubber hand, condition IS). The order of pre-
sentation of congruent-related and incongruent-related questions was
counterbalanced across subjects (see Appendix).
Participants
Fifteen naive, healthy, right-handed volunteers (9 females, 6 males, mean
age 36.8 ± 7.2 years) with no history of neurological or psychiatric
illness gave their informed written consent to participate in this study.
The study was approved by the local ethics committee (Medical Faculty
of the RWTH Aachen, Aachen, Germany). One participant was excluded
because his/her head displacement during the experimental session
was >6 mm. Unlike previous studies (e.g., Ehrsson et al. 2004),
participants were not screened prior to the experiment to check
whether they could experience the RHI or not. Because any prior
knowledge or experience of the illusion could have confounded the
Figure 2. The experimental setup and temporal sequence of events. At the beginning of the trial, participants judged the felt location of their own middle finger. Then the rubber
hand appeared and visuotactile stimulation was delivered for 125 s. Acquisition of the PET data began 60 s after the onset of visuotactile stimulation and lasted for 60 s. In the
condition shown, the participant is looking at an incongruent rubber hand identity with respect to his/her own stimulated hand. At the end of trial, participants judged anew the felt
location of their own middle finger.
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neuroimaging data, we decided to test unscreened volunteers. There-
fore, all participants were naive as to the illusion and purposes of the
experiment. Because we were speciﬁcally interested in the experience
of the illusion, we included in the analysis only those subjects who
experienced the illusion as measured by the proprioceptive drift. We
therefore excluded 4 participants who did not show the predicted
interaction between body scheme and sensory stimulation associated
with the sense of ownership in the RHI (Tsakiris and Haggard 2005b).
Speciﬁcally, subjects with smaller perceptual shifts, deﬁned as the
difference between proprioceptive drifts in the synchronous and
asynchronous conditions, for the congruent rubber hand condition
compared with the incongruent rubber hand condition were excluded
((CS – CA) < (IS – IA)). Thus, surviving data refer to the 10 participants
who experienced the illusion as measured by proprioceptive drift (6
females, mean age 37.2 ± 7.2 years). Each of the 10 subjects included in
the analysis satisﬁed this criterion of showing larger perceptual shifts for
the congruent rubber hand condition compared with the incongruent
rubber hand condition, that is (CS – CA) > (IS – IA). In these subjects, the
mean size of the critical interaction [(CS – CA) – (IS – IA)] was 3 cm
(standard error: 0.5, min: 1.3 cm, max: 7 cm).
PET Hardware and Procedures
Measurements of regional cerebral blood ﬂow (rCBF) were taken using
an ECAT EXACT 922/47 PET scanner (Siemens-CTI, Knoxville, TN) in
a 3-dimensional (3D) acquisition mode using standard technology and
procedures previously described in detail (see Weiss et al. 2000, 2003).
Attenuation correction was performed by transmission scanning prior
to emission scanning using 3 external [68Ge]/[68Ga] rod sources
(transmission scan time, 15 min). Simultaneously with the intravenous
bolus injection of 500 MBq [15O] water, a dynamic emission scan
protocol: 6 3 5 s, 5 3 10 s = 80 s was started in 3D acquisition mode. The
integrated counts over 60 s were used as an index of the rCBF. After
Fourier rebinning of 3D data, 47 fully corrected transaxial planes of 3.38
mm slice thickness were reconstructed in a 128 3 128 matrix (pixel
size, 1.72 mm) using 2D ﬁltered back-projection (FBP) algorithm and
a Hanning ﬁlter with a cutoff frequency of 0.5 Ny (ECAT 7.2 software).
Participants laid comfortably in the PET scanner with the head
positioned in a dedicated holder. An intravenous cannula was placed
in their left cubital vein for injection of the radioactive tracer. Each
subject underwent 12 PET scans in a single session, comprising 3
replications of each of the 4 conditions. Acquisition of the PET data
began 60 s after the onset of visuotactile stimulation and lasted for 60 s.
For each subject, anatomical magnetic resonance imaging scans were
obtained with a T1-weighted 3D fast ﬁeld-echo (FFE) sequence on a 1.5-T
Philips Gyroscan NT (Philips Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands)
using a standard head coil.
Imaging Processing and Statistical Analysis
Following standard image preprocessing (including image realignment,
image normalization into standard stereotactic space, and smoothing
using a 12-mm full width half maximum Gaussian smoothing kernel),
statistical analyses were performed using SPM2 (http://www.ﬁl.ion.u-
cl.ac.uk/spm). For each voxel, across all participants and all scans, the
mean relative rCBF values were calculated separately for each of the
main effects. Comparisons of the means were made using the t-statistic
and thereafter transformed into normally distributed Z-statistics. The
resulting set of Z values constituted a statistical parametric map (SPM{Z}
map), thresholded at P < 0.0005 uncorrected at the voxel level. For the
contrasts of interest, the signiﬁcance of these statistical parametric maps
was assessed by comparing the expected and observed distribution of
the t-statistic under the null hypothesis of no differential activation
effect on rCBF. SPM2 was also used to identify brain areas where activity
was associated with a phenomenal measure of the illusion, namely, the
proprioceptive drift of the stimulated hand toward the rubber hand
(Tsakiris and Haggard 2005b). The proprioceptive drift for each trial was
used as a covariate, and regression with this covariate was calculated for
every voxel in the whole brain. The signiﬁcance of the regression was
displayed in a SPM[t] map, which was then transformed into a SPM{Z}
and thresholded at P < 0.0005 uncorrected at the voxel level. Brain
activity localization was identiﬁed using the atlas of neuroanatomy by
Duvernoy (1999) and the SPM anatomy toolbox (Eickhoff et al. 2005).
Results
Behavioral Data
A baseline pretest proprioceptive judgment was obtained prior
to visuotactile stimulation and a posttest judgment after
stimulation in each trial. The pretest judgment was subtracted
from the posttest judgment. The term proprioceptive drift
refers to this change in perceived hand position as a result of
visuotactile stimulation. Figure 3 shows the change in the
perceived position of the hand between the start and the end of
the stimulation period in each condition of the factorial design,
averaged over 10 participants.
The mean proprioceptive drifts across conditions (see Fig. 3)
were submitted to a 2 3 2 repeated measures analysis of
variance with 2 within-subjects factors. The ﬁrst factor was
the rubber hand identity (congruent vs. incongruent), and the
second factor was the mode of visuotactile stimulation (syn-
chronous vs. asynchronous). The main effect of the rubber hand
identity was not signiﬁcant (F1,9 = 0.005, P > 0.05). The mode of
visuotactile stimulation showed a signiﬁcant main effect (F1,9 =
7.397, P < 0.05). Importantly, the interaction of the 2 factors
was highly signiﬁcant (F1,9 = 50.922, P < 0.05). We then
compared the mean drift in each condition against zero,
adjusting for the number of conditions using a Bonferroni
correction. This showed a signiﬁcant drift only in the congruent
synchronous condition (t9 = 5.4, P < 0.001), conﬁrming previous
results (Tsakiris and Haggard 2005b).
After the scanning session, participants completed a question-
naire adjusted from Botvinick and Cohen (1998) regarding the
illusory sense of body ownership during the RHI. Participants
experienced the illusion only when they were looking at
a congruent rubber hand identity. In particular, they afﬁrmed
that 1) they felt as if they were feeling the touch at the location
where the congruent rubber hand was being touched (t8 = 1.9,
P < 0.05) and 2) they felt as if the congruent rubber hand was
their own hand (t8 = 2.2, P < 0.05). These introspective data
replicate previous studies (Botvinick and Cohen 1998; Ehrsson
et al. 2004) and corroborate the quantitative psychophysical
data on the perceived position of the hand.
Figure 3. Mean proprioceptive drifts averaged over 10 participants across
conditions. Error bars indicate standard errors. Point ‘‘zero’’ represents the felt position
of the participant’s hand prior to stimulation. A positive proprioceptive drift represents
a mislocalization toward the rubber hand. CS: congruent rubber hand/synchronous
stimulation, CA: congruent rubber hand/asynchronous stimulation, IS: incongruent
rubber hand/synchronous stimulation, IA: incongruent rubber hand/asynchronous
stimulation.
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PET Data
We analyzed the PET data in 2 ways. First, we used a 2 3 2
factorial design to investigate the conditions that caused the il-
lusion (see Table 1). Second, we used a parametric design to
investigate the neural correlates of the effects of the illusion,
that is, the experience of ownership of the rubber hand or the
failure to incorporate the rubber hand, by focusing on the
correlation between neural activity and a quantitative proxy of
the RHI, namely, the proprioceptive drift toward or away from
the rubber hand (see Table 2).
The main effect of synchronous visuotactile stimulation
corresponding to the contrast (CS + IS) – (CA + IA) showed
activity in the left middle frontal gyrus and the right inferior
lingual gyrus. The main effect of asynchronous stimulation
corresponding to the contrast (CA + IA) – (CS + IS) showed
activations in the thalamus, the right rolandic operculum, the
left superior postcentral sulcus and postcentral gyrus, the left
superior frontal sulcus, and the right circular insular sulcus. The
main effect of looking at a congruent rubber hand being
stimulated corresponding to the contrast (CS + CA) – (IS + IA)
showed activity in the right precentral gyrus, the right putamen,
and the left superior occipital gyrus. The main effect of looking
at an incongruent identity corresponding to the contrast (IS +
IA) – (CS + CA) showed bilateral activity in amygdala and the left
parahippocampal gyrus.
The illusion interaction term of the factorial design was
assessed using the contrast (CS – CA) – (IS – IA). Activity
reﬂecting this interaction was observed in the right middle
cingulate cortex. We also investigated brain areas showing the
inverse interaction pattern, (CA – CS) – (IA – IS). This interaction
reveals brain activity when sensory evidence and preexisting
body scheme representations give conﬂicting information about
ownership. That is, a conﬂict between viewed and felt stimu-
lation in the asynchronous condition suggests that the rubber
hand does not correspond to the participant’s own hand, but
the visual appearance of the rubber hand suggests it does. Based
on the study by Fink et al. (1999), we hypothesized that
intersensory conﬂict would be related to right frontal activity.
We therefore performed an additional small-volume correction
(SVC) with x = 40, y = 8, z = 22 as coordinates (from the results
from Fink et al. 1999) and a radius of 10 mm. This analysis
showed a signiﬁcant differential effect in the right rolandic
operculum (P < 0.05; SVC). In addition to this predicted
activation, conﬂict-related activity was detected in the left
postcentral gyrus and the left precentral gyrus.
Correlation of Neuroimaging and Psychophysical Data
Our second analysis focused on identifying the neural correlates
of the subjective experience of ownership rather than on the
sensory conditions used to induce it. The effects of global
changes in blood ﬂow between conditions were modeled as
a confound using a subject-speciﬁc analysis of covariance. SPM2
was used to identify brain areas where activity was predicted by
the subjective experience of the illusion of owning the rubber
hand. To this end, the proprioceptive drift was used as
a covariate, and a linear regression was calculated for every
voxel in the whole brain.
On the basis of previous studies on bodily self-awareness by
Farrer et al. (2003) and Ehrsson et al. (2004), we hypothesized
a priori that the insula (Farrer et al. 2003) and the frontal
operculum (Ehrsson et al. 2004) should correlate positively
with the felt proprioceptive drift. Using the respective coor-
dinates in the posterior insula (x = 40, y = –10, z = 16; Farrer et al.
2003) and frontal operculum (x = 54, y = 18, z = 12; Ehrsson et al.
2004) for SVC (10 mm radius), we observed signiﬁcant
activations (P < 0.05; SVC) in both these predicted areas.
Regression analysis demonstrated a positive relation between
rCBF and proprioceptive drift in the right posterior insula (t =
3.41, P < 0.05, see Fig. 4a) and the right frontal operculum (t =
3.25, P < 0.05). Extending the regression analysis to the whole
brain without SVC revealed a positive correlation between rCBF
and proprioceptive drift in the left brainstem and the left middle
frontal gyrus in addition to the right posterior insula and the
right frontal operculum.
A negative correlation between rCBF and proprioceptive drift
was observed in the left postcentral gyrus (see Fig. 4b), the left
parietal operculum, the left hippocampus, and the left posterior
cingulate cortex. Note that activity in the left postcentral gyrus
Table 1
Local maxima of the areas of differentially increased neural activity associated with the main
effects of the 2 3 2 factorial experimental design which are significant at P\ 0.0005
uncorrected at the voxel level
Brain regions MNI coordinates KE Z-score
x y z
Main effect of synchronous stimulation (CS þ IS)  (CA þ IA)
L middle frontal gyrus 20 26 34 95 4.30
R inferior lingual gyrus (BA 18) 6 64 6 27 3.30
Main effect of asynchronous stimulation (CA þ IA)  (CS þ IS)
Thalamus 2 2 0 262 5.58
R rolandic operculum 52 20 22 468 5.19
L superior postcentral sulcus (BA 1) 24 50 72 148 3.90
L postcentral gyrus (BA 6) 24 42 74 3.79
L superior frontal sulcus 30 0 68 41 3.78
R circular insular sulcus 42 0 20 29 3.40
Main effect of congruent rubber hand identity (CS þ CA)  (IS þ IA)
R precentral gyrus (BA 6) 66 4 26 49 3.82
R putamen 30 6 6 64 3.67
L superior occipital gyrus 26 94 24 24 3.43
Main effect of incongruent rubber hand identity (IS þ IA)  (CS þ CA)
L amygdala 28 6 28 49 3.59
L parahippocampal gyrus 32 40 8 25 3.50
R amygdala 32 2 28 16 3.45
Illusion interaction effect (CS  CA)  (IS  IA)
R middle cingulate cortex 8 20 36 35 3.46
Conflict interaction effect (CA  CS)  (IA  IS)
L postcentral gyrus (BA 1) 52 26 62 28 3.70
L precentral gyrus (BA 6) 28 12 64 24 3.61
R rolandic operculum 44 0 14 42 3.47
Note: L, Left; R, Right; MNI, Montreal Neurological Institute.
Table 2
Local maxima of brain areas of increased neural activity (significant at P\ 0.0005 uncorrected at
the voxel level) that is positively or negatively correlated with the phenomenal proxy of the RHI,
namely the proprioceptive drift toward or away from the rubber hand
Brain regions MNI coordinates KE Z-score
x y z
Positive correlation between rCBF and proprioceptive drift
R posterior insula/R rolandic operculum 44 10 14 53 3.63
L brainstem 8 34 36 14 3.54
R frontal operculum (BA 44) 58 12 4 36 3.54
L middle frontal gyrus 30 54 26 15 3.36
Negative correlation between rCBF and proprioceptive drift
L postcentral gyrus (BA 2/3b/3a) 42 24 40 443 5.11
L parietal operculum 46 22 26 3.69
L hippocampus 28 20 22 103 3.92
R posterior cingulate cortex 4 34 22 51 3.63
Note: L, Left; R, Right; MNI, Montreal Neurological Institute.
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survived whole-brain volume correction for multiple compar-
isons (P < 0.05 using family-wise error rate).
Discussion
We investigated the neural signatures of body ownership using
the RHI. The conditions that induce the illusion involve visual
and tactile stimulation, but the perceptual experience that
induces the illusion may be quite distinct from the sense of
ownership itself. For this reason, we distinguished between the
neural activations and perceptual conditions that lead to sense
of ownership and the neural correlates corresponding to
phenomenal experience of ownership. We particularly focused
on the correlation between neural activity and a quantitative
proxy of the RHI, namely, the proprioceptive drift toward or
away from the rubber hand. The present results suggest that the
phenomenal incorporation of a rubber hand is reﬂected by
activity of the right posterior insula and the right frontal
operculum. Conversely, the failure to experience ownership
over the rubber hand is related to activity in the contralateral
primary and secondary somatosensory cortices.
Few neuroimaging studies have studied body ownership
(Ehrsson et al. 2004; Ehrsson, Holmes, and Passingham 2005).
Ehrsson et al. (2004) showed bilateral neural activity in the
ventral premotor cortex and the frontal operculum in the con-
ditions that ‘‘induced’’ the RHI. That study focused on the
causes (i.e., congruent visual and tactile stimulation) of the RHI,
but the RHI was not quantiﬁed behaviorally. In addition, the
phenomenal effect of the illusion, namely, the sense of body
ownership of the rubber hand, was not separated from the
conditions that induced it. The present study replicated the
activation in the right frontal operculum but failed to show
activity in premotor cortex. This may perhaps be explained by
differences in the methods and experimental designs of the 2
studies. The study by Ehrsson et al. emphasized the dynamic
process of visuotactile integration that occurs around the onset
of the illusion by using shorter blocks of visuotactile stimulation
(42 s) than the present study (125 s). In fact, in that study the
onset of the illusion, which subjects had to indicate by pressing
a button with their left foot, was used as an event in their
analysis model. To that end, the results of Ehrsson et al. reﬂect
the onset of the incorporation process, whereas the present
results reﬂect the steady state of being incorporated.
In our study, acquisition of the neuroimaging data began only
after the ﬁrst 45 s of visuotactile stimulation and lasted for 60 s.
Data collected by Ehrsson et al. suggest that the RHI begins
approximately after 11 (±7) s of stimulation. Data collected by
Tsakiris and Haggard (2005b) suggest that the main effect of
correlated visuotactile stimulation on generating propriocep-
tive drifts toward the rubber hand is particularly strong during
the ﬁrst 60 s, after which the drift increases in a less exponential
manner for up to 3 min. Based on these observations, it seems
that by the onset of PET data acquisition in the present study
(60 s after the onset of visuotactile stimulation), participants
were already experiencing the illusion and that the recalibra-
tion of their hand position associated with the onset of the
Figure 4. (a) Activity in the right posterior insula (x5 44, y5 10, z5 14) was positively correlated (t5 3.41, P\0.05) with the proprioceptive drift toward the rubber hand.
(b) Activity in the left somatosensory cortex (x5 42, y5 24, z5 40) was negatively correlated (t5 4.84, P\ 0.05) with the proprioceptive drift toward the rubber hand.
Positive drifts indicate a drift toward the rubber hand, and negative drifts indicate a drift away from the rubber hand. Activations show averaged data over 10 participants (L5 Left,
R 5 Right).
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illusion had already occurred. It is unclear whether sustained
activity in the premotor cortex occurs during prolonged
stimulation periods or whether premotor activity reﬂects only
the onset of the dynamic processes involved in ownership
changes. The dynamic changes associated with the illusion
onset were not emphasized in the present study due to the low
temporal resolution of PET. Typically, epoch-related neural
responses are assessed in PET because of the relatively long
half-life of the radiotracers used. Thus, the use of PET allowed us
to detect sustained neural activity that was speciﬁcally related
to the assimilation of visuotactile stimulation that leads to the
feeling of ownership of the rubber hand and not to the onset of
the RHI per se.
The Causes of the RHI
The factorial analysis of the conditions causing ownership
revealed a frontoparietal network for the perception of body-
related multisensory signals. Activations in the left parietal
cortex associated with asynchronous visuotactile stimulation
were localized in the contralateral primary somatosensory
cortex and the contralateral superior parietal lobule (SPL). In
the asynchronous condition, subjects saw ﬁrst the rubber hand
being touched, and they then felt touch on their own hand.
Activity in the contralateral somatosensory cortex during
asynchronous stimulation may reﬂect neural processing related
to the anticipation of the tactile stimulus on the participant’s
hand that always followed the visual stimulation of the rubber
hand. This view is supported by a recent study showing that the
contralateral somatosensory cortex is activated during antici-
pation of tactile stimulation (Carlsson et al. 2000).
The left SPL may play an important role in body-part
localization. Felician et al. (2004) showed a selective activation
of the left SPL at similar coordinates to the present study (x =
–18, y = –50, z = 72) when subjects were asked to localize their
body parts. In that study, subjects were asked to point with
either their left or their right hand to an indicated body part or
a spatial location inside the scanner. Pointing movements were
performed by rotating their wrist along a vertical axis in the
direction of the opposite side of the body or space. The contrast
of body localization versus space localization showed strong
activation in the left SPL, irrespective of the side of the part that
had to be localized and of the hand used. In the present study,
asynchronous stimulation did not elicit signiﬁcant propriocep-
tive drifts toward the rubber hand. Put another way, subjects
retained a strong sense of the actual body-part localization
despite the appearance of the rubber hand in an adjacent
location. The observed activation in the left SPL in the
asynchronous condition may thus reﬂect this internal sense of
body-part localization.
Our main interest in the factorial analysis focused on the in-
teraction term. In particular, the conﬂict interaction (CA – CS) –
(IA – IS) identiﬁed the speciﬁc activation for a visual appearance
of the rubber hand which was congruent with the subject’s own
hand, but the timing of visual and tactile stimulation suggested
the opposite. The right rolandic operculum was active when
participants experienced this conﬂict between proprioception,
touch, and vision. The functional role of this area would be to
detect and resolve various conﬂicting signals between internal
and external representations of body-related events. Fink et al.
(1999) used a mirror to manipulate visual feedback, while
subjects performed the Luria bimanual coordination task. In
some conditions, the participant’s intention and proprioceptive
feedback indicated out-of-phase hand movements, whereas the
mirror showed in-phase hand movements. The mismatch
between intention, proprioception, and vision activated the
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, in particular, a dorsal area
(Brodmann area [BA] 9/46) in right lateral prefrontal cortex. In
a second experiment, using passive movements, a right ventral,
lateral frontal region, anterior to the peak of activation in the
present study, was again activated by intersensory conﬂict.
Importantly, the observed right frontal activity in the study by
Fink et al. associated with the detection of sensorimotor and
also intersensory conﬂict during bimanual hand movements was
independent of the hand attended. In the present study, tactile
attention was always focused on the subject’s right hand. The
right hand was stimulated across all conditions, whereas visual
attention was focused either on a left or on a right rubber hand.
It seems possible that the sensitivity of the right (i.e., ipsilateral)
frontal cortex to sensory conﬂict is independent to the
stimulated or attended hand. Here, unlike in previous studies,
this conﬂict is purely sensory and does not involve action. This
area may thus be involved not only in conﬂicts of agency but also
in conﬂicts of ownership.
The Failure of Incorporation of the Rubber Hand
A negative correlation between the proprioceptive measure of
the illusion and rCBF was observed in the contralateral parietal
cortex, in particular in the left primary and secondary somato-
sensory cortices. An important behavioral/phenomenal corre-
late of the attribution of the rubber hand to one’s own body is
a change in the perceived location of the subject’s hand toward
the rubber hand (Tsakiris and Haggard 2005b). That is, larger
proprioceptive drifts toward the rubber hand correspond to
more powerful illusions or ownership (Botvinick and Cohen
1998). A small or negative proprioceptive drift indicates that the
rubber hand has not been attributed to one’s own body,
presumably because of a discrepancy between the propriocep-
tive and tactile experience of the subject’s own hand and the
visual perception of the rubber hand. In these situations, the
internal proprioceptive representation of the body is not
captured by visual input.
We found strong contralateral somatosensory activation to
correlate with this internal representation of one’s own body.
This result is consistent with previous research on visual
perspective taking and abstract forms of self-processing. Other
studies have reported that the left parietal cortex is involved not
only in distinguishing between self and other but also in
maintaining a stored reference of the self. For example, Ruby
and Decety (2001) showed that the left inferior parietal and the
left somatosensory cortices were speciﬁcally involved in dis-
tinguishing assertions about the self versus others. In that study,
the somatosensory cortex was activated only when the ﬁrst-
person perspective was compared with the third-person
perspective, suggesting that this area is critically involved in
distinguishing self from other. Other studies have also suggested
that primary and secondary somatosensory cortices are associ-
ated with body awareness (Hari et al. 1998; Schwartz et al.
2005). A patient reported by Hari et al. (1998) occasionally
perceived a ‘‘ghost’’ left hand, which copied the previous
positions of his/her real left hand with approximately 1 min
time lag. Neuromagnetic recordings revealed that activity of the
left secondary somatosensory cortex was strongly suppressed
during the experience of the left ghost arm. Activation in left
secondary somatosensory cortex was also observed when
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subjects watched someone else’s leg being touched (Keysers
et al. 2004; see also Blakemore et al. 2005), independently of
whether subjects saw a left or a right leg being touched. This
ﬁnding seems compatible with the ‘‘not me’’ quality of the
failure to experience ownership over the rubber hand in the
present study.
It may be suggested that the somatosensory cortex, by
maintaining a stored reference of the body, is particularly
sensitive to handedness (i.e., left- vs. right-hand manipulation)
and related anatomic constrains (see also Costantini et al. 2005),
to the kinesthetic proprioceptive space (i.e., proprioceptive
drift), and to both visual and tactile inputs (see also Schaefer
et al. 2005; Schaefer, Flor, et al. 2006; Schaefer, Noennig, et al.
2006). Thus, the somatosensory cortex may be involved in the
processing of an internal reference body representation. More
speciﬁcally, as suggested in the relevant literature (Hari et al.
1998; Ruby and Decety 2001; Keysers et al. 2004), self--other
distinctions seem to involve speciﬁcally the ‘‘left’’ secondary
somatosensory cortex. This would be in line with our results.
However, given the fact that tactile stimulation in the present
study was always delivered on the participant’s right hand, it is
difﬁcult to interpret the left, contralateral somatosensory
activation in terms of its laterality. To solve this question,
further investigations including tactile stimulation of both
hands would be necessary.
The Experience of Body Ownership
The experience of ownership of the rubber hand as measured
by the proprioceptive behavioral data was positively correlated
with activity in the right posterior insula and right frontal
operculum. The insula and the frontal operculum are recipro-
cally connected through efferent and afferent projections (for
a review, see Augustine 1996). Bilateral frontal operculum
activity was found by Ehrsson et al. (2004) when subjects
experienced the RHI. Activity in the insula has been found in
numerous studies involving the self. Right insular activity is
consistently implicated in self-attribution (Farrer and Frith
2002; Farrer et al. 2003), self-processing (Fink et al. 1996;
Vogeley et al. 2004), and the representation of an egocentric
reference frame (Fink et al. 2003). It should be kept in mind,
however, that the activation observed in the insula extended
into the right operculum. The right rolandic operculum was
active during the detection of conﬂict between visuotactile
stimulation and hand identity as shown in our factorial analysis.
However, the 2 activations were distinct and did not overlap.
Clearly, the separation of activations spreading across sulci or
ﬁssures always imposes problems in activation studies. Never-
theless, PET designs enable the separation of activation peaks
even in the millimeter range (Shipp et al. 1995; Fink et al. 1997).
The role of right posterior insula in integrating body signals
related to egocentric representation, agency, and possibly body
ownership is supported by a series of recent studies. For
example, Fink et al. (2003) showed that activation of right
posterior insula was related to a distortion of the egocentric
reference frame using galvanic vestibular stimulation. Farrer and
Frith (2002) proposed that the sense of agency results from the
integration of multiple body- and action-related signals. This
integrating process was thought to involve the right insular
cortex. For example, Farrer et al. (2003) showed that activation
in the right posterior insula decreased when subjects experi-
enced a discordance between what they did and what they saw,
suggesting that activity in the posterior insula correlates with
the degree of congruence between different signals used for
attribution of actions to oneself. The present study extends
these ﬁndings by showing a correlation between activity in the
insula and sense of body ownership. Body ownership might be
considered a form of self-attribution speciﬁcally for body parts,
and in parallel to the self-attribution of actions. Previous studies
focused on posterior insula activation during self-attribution of
actions. In contrast, we show that posterior insula is active even
in the absence of efferent information, when a nonacting
subject must integrate multisensory information to decide on
the attribution of body parts to oneself. Thus, insular activity
may reﬂect body ownership rather than agency. Because agency
typically involves both efferent and afferent signals (Tsakiris and
Haggard 2005a; Tsakiris et al. 2005), previous studies have been
unable to distinguish between these alternatives. Attribution of
body ownership may be more fundamental than action attribu-
tion because the latter involves an additional efferent compo-
nent that the former lacks.
Interestingly, a recent lesion mapping study suggests that the
right posterior insula is commonly damaged in patients with
anosognosia for hemiparesis but is signiﬁcantly less involved in
hemiparetic patients without anosognosia (Karnath et al. 2005;
see also Cereda et al. 2002). The present ﬁndings support the
hypothesis that the insular cortex is integral to bodily self-
awareness. Anosognosia for hemiplegia is also associated with
lesions in right BA44 and right BA6 (Berti et al. 2005), suggesting
that the denial of motor deﬁcits arises, in part, by a failure to
monitor the signals related to one’s own movement. One
consequence of that failure would be to ‘‘ignore’’ the conﬂict
between signals related to the intended and the actual states of
the limbs, resulting in anosognosia. Thus, the patient might not
register that their limb fails to move on command. Our work,
however, suggests that the normal construction of bodily
awareness can be based on purely sensory signals processed
in the right frontal and parietal cortices. This is in line with
converging neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence
which suggests that the neural substrates of sensorimotor
bodily awareness are functionally lateralized to the right hemi-
sphere, whereas the left hemisphere seems to underpin mostly
linguistic and semantic body representations (for a review, see
Berlucchi and Aglioti 1997).
Conclusions
We used the RHI to study the neural correlates of body
ownership. We suggested that the causes and the effect of the
RHI are associated with distinct neural processes. Correlation
between synchronous visual and tactile percepts is a necessary
condition for the inducement of the RHI. A conﬂict between
visual and tactile percepts does not induce the illusion. The
present study showed that right frontal cortex monitors the
perception of body-related sensory signals when a conﬂict
arises, blocking the attribution of the rubber hand to one’s own
body. The effect of this failure to incorporate the rubber hand,
namely, the feeling that the rubber hand is not part of one’s own
body, is associated with somatosensory activity contralateral to
the stimulated right hand. Conversely, when visual and tactile
percepts are congruent, the premotor cortex in both
hemispheres seems to underpin the processes of multisensory
integration that cause the RHI (Ehrsson et al. 2004; Ehrsson,
Holmes, and Passingham 2005). Finally, the effect of multisen-
sory integration and recalibration of hand position, namely, the
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experience of body ownership of the rubber hand, is correlated
with activity in the right posterior insula.
Importantly, we found activations in the right posterior insula
and right frontal cortex related to a basic process of self-
consciousness, namely, body ownership, in the absence ofmotor
action. Previously, these areas have been associated with a sense
of agency resulting from motor command prediction. Body
ownership is a standard consequence of agency, but agency
involves additional elements that do not occur in body owner-
ship. Previous studies may have misidentiﬁed as signatures of
motor agency neural activations, which in fact correspond to the
body ownership that agency generally entails. This confusion
can occur when experimental designs do not adequately
disentangle afferent and efferent information. We suggest that
a basic formof bodily self-consciousness is generated in the brain
by sensory stimulation and assimilation to a preexisting body
scheme. Agency would represent a special but important
addition to this essentially sensory circuit for self-consciousness.
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Appendix: Questionnaire Administered after the Experiment
The questions for the congruent rubber hand identity were the
following:
1. When I was looking at a right rubber hand, it seemed as if I
were feeling the touch of the paintbrush in the location
where I saw the fake hand being touched.
2. When I was looking at a right rubber hand, it seemed as
though the touch I felt was caused by the paintbrush
touching the rubber hand.
3. When I was looking at a right rubber hand, I felt as if the
rubber hand were my hand.
4. When I was looking at a right rubber hand, it felt as if my
(real) hand were drifting towards the rubber hand.
5. When I was looking at a right rubber hand, it seemed as if I
might have more than one right hand or arm.
6. When I was looking at a right rubber hand, it seemed as if
the touch I was feeling came from somewhere between
my own hand and the rubber hand.
7. When I was looking at a right rubber hand, it felt as if my
(real) hand were turning ‘rubbery’.
8. When I was looking at a right rubber hand, it appeared
(visually) as if the rubber hand were drifting towards my
hand
9. When I was looking at a right rubber hand, the rubber
hand began to resemble my own (real) hand, in terms of
shape, skin tone, freckles or some other visual feature.
The same questions were presented for the incongruent rubber hand
identity, but now the ‘‘right rubber hand’’ was replaced by ‘‘left rubber
hand.’’
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